### Framework 2AC

#### COUNTER INTERP – the aff can translate the resolution

#### PREFER

#### A) DIRECTION OF THE RESOLUTION – they can say restrictions on wind are good so they can access their generic ground – means we solve SSD

#### B) NO OFFENSE – every 1ac is a different translation of the resolution - their predictability arguments are all a façade

#### NET BENEFITS

#### WORLD DA – they try to construct a world of the resolution whereby one totality can explain all of debate – this means the advantage is a DA to their interp of debate – extend the 1AC they lead to bad environmental policy making which internal link turns their argument

#### ENTROPY DA – attempts to contain inevitable disorder in translation of the resolution 🡺 collapse of their view of debate – takes out their unq arguments

#### TRANSLATION GOOD – key to education – we shouldn’t be viewed as mere intermediaries of the resolution and traditional debate – their interp leads to the production of docile bodies incapable of interacting with the world

#### Objects construct their environments – attempts to uphold debate as such 🡺 passivity

Bryant Professor of Philosophy at Collin College 2011 Levi Democracy of Objects http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/9750134.0001.001/1:9/--democracy-of-objects?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

In short, environments cannot be treated as something that is simply given or there such that the organism subsequently fills a niche that already existed in the environment. Rather, organisms take an active role in constructing their environment, both through determining relevancies in the environment and through actively changing their environment through activities like building nests. In terms of autopoietic theory, systems (organisms/objects) determine that to which they are open or what is relevant in the world about them. In other words, there is no such thing as an “environment as such”. Rather, we can only discover what constitutes the environment of an organism through a second-order observation of how the organism relates to the world around them.

A central axiom of traditional evolutionary biology is that “the organism proposes and the environment disposes”. Here the theory runs that random variations within the population of a species are proposed as various solutions to the problem of the environment. Individual organisms are proposed as various solutions to the problem posed by the environment. The premise of such a thesis is that the environment is something there, present-at-hand, that the organism must adapt to. This thesis, however, becomes significantly complicated when we recognize that organisms construct their own environments. Here the organism can no longer be treated as a passive object, such that genes and the environment are the subjects forming this object, but rather the organism itself becomes a “subject” that plays a role both in how its genes are actualized and how its environment is constructed. This does not entail that the organism is a sovereign acting without constraint in a purely smooth space it can define at will, but it does entail a far more active role on the part of the organism in these processes.

### Framework 2AC

#### EPISTEMOLOGY BAD – extend Bryant – their focus on epistemology and knowledge construction makes democracy impossible – their desire to test the truth of the aff is an epistemic fallacy that should be refused in favor of our investigation of ontology

Bryant Professor of Philosophy at Collin College 2011 Levi Democracy of Objects http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/9750134.0001.001/1:5/--democracy-of-objects?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

Here it is necessary to clarify what the epistemic fallacy is and is not about. A critique of the epistemic fallacy and how it operates in philosophy does not amount to the claim that epistemology or questions of the nature of inquiry and knowledge are a fallacy. What the epistemic fallacy identifies is the fallacy of reducing ontological questions to epistemological questions, or conflating questions of how we know with questions of what beings are. In short, the epistemic fallacy occurs wherever being is reduced to our access to being. Thus, for example, wherever beings are reduced to our impressions or sensations of being, wherever being is reduced to our talk about being, wherever being is reduced to discourses about being, wherever being is reduced to signs through which being is manifest, the epistemic fallacy has been committed.

We have seen why this is so, for our experimental practice is only intelligible based on a series of ontological premises and these ontological premises cannot be reduced to our access to being. They are ontological in the robust sense. These ontological premises refer not to what is present or actual to us. Indeed, they refer, as we will see, to beings that are radically withdrawn from any presence or actuality. And as such, they are genuinely ontological premises, not epistemological premises pertaining to what is given.

In recognizing that the epistemic fallacy emerges from foundationalist aspirations on the part of philosophers, Bhaskar hits the mark. It is the desire for a secure and certain foundation for knowledge that leads philosophy to adopt the actualist stance and fall into the epistemic fallacy. These decisions, in turn, ultimately lead to correlationism. In raising the question, “how do we know?” and seeking an argument that would thoroughly defeat the skeptic or sophist, the philosopher concludes that only what is present or given can defend against the incursions of the skeptic. But what is present or given turns out either to be mind or sensations. Therefore the philosopher finds himself in the position of restricting all being to what is given as actual in sensations. From here a whole cascade of problematic consequences follow that increasingly lead to the dissolution of the world as a genuine ontological category.

However, once these foundationalist aspirations are abandoned, the nature of the problem changes significantly and we no longer find ourselves tied to the actualist premise that generates all of these issues. And indeed, these aspirations should be abandoned, for foundationalism is premised on the possibility of absolute presence, absolute proximity, the absence of all absence, and we have now discovered that it is being itself that is split between generative mechanisms or objects and the actual. Difference, deferral, absence, and so on are not idiosyncracies of our being preventing us from ever reaching being, but are, rather, ontological characteristics of being as such. Moreover, this split at the heart of all beings is not simply characteristic of those objects that we would seek to know, but are also characteristics of the peculiar object that we are. We ourselves are split. If, then, this split is a general ontological feature of the world, then the dream of presence required for any form of foundationalism is a priori impossible. We are then left with two paths: to persist in the correlationist thesis that would reduce ontological questions to epistemological questions and which is itself implicitly premised on the ontotheological assumption of actualism, or to investigate the split in being in a post-humanist, realist fashion that is genuinely ontological. It is the second of these two paths that I here attempt.

### AT Shively

#### Not only is it possible to have a debate without a previously agreed ground – it is desirable. Debates can engage each other across perspectives through cross-arguing which heightens the transformative potential of debate.

**Hicks ‘2** Darrin Hicks is Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Denver in Denver, Colorado. “The Promise(s) of Deliberative Democracy *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 5.2 (2002) 223-260 Project Muse

The very possibility of argumentation, it seems, trades upon the existence of some substantively constituted common ground, even if merely an agreement on the procedural norms regulating critical discussion. As we have seen throughout this review, however, the possibility of such a rational consensus on either substantive or procedural grounds remains a problematic, if not an impossible, assumption. So, Yameng Liu argues, the field of argumentation studies in particular and the rhetorical discipline in general have shied away from developing normative theoretical models of argumentation between culturally heterogonous and ideologically incompatible agents. 87 Yet cross-cultural argumentation between ideologically opposed agents does occur and it is not always futile. By looking toward these encounters, in particular the debate between the East and West over human rights, Liu finds that argument across cultural and ideological divides does not necessarily require the preexistence of common ground; rather, the methods and norms of what he terms "cross-arguing," which unlike dialogical models presupposes an adversarial and even a mutually hostile relationship amongst members, constitutes the grounds necessary for continued negotiation and the construction of new conceptual frameworks. Specifically, Liu found that in the debates over human rights, non-Western advocates became adroit at using the terms and methods of Western discourse. They became experts at formulating their positions within Western conceptual frames and, moreover, were able to exploit the internal contradictions of Western human rights discourses as a means of both showing how their positions were warranted within the Western tradition and how U.S. domestic policy could be consistently critiqued with its own conceptual tools. Non-Western advocates found that [b]y strategically aligning themselves with some Western positions and perspectives against others, they would be able to blur the line between Self and Other, or between the protagonist and the antagonist in a cross-communal debate, making it more complicated and difficult for their opponents to maintain their focus on the target of their criticism or to sustain their argumentative offensive. 88 [End Page 254] Consistently faced with this tactic, Western diplomats and critics found themselves in a strategically awkward position. They could either refuse to engage their non-Western interlocutors—a tactic used by some public commentators like William Safire—or they could respond in kind by justifying Western positions on human rights in non-Western terms, a tactic endorsed by William Alford, Daniel Bell, and Amartya Sen. 89 Thus, Western advocates too were able to find counter-traditions within non-Western discourses to justify liberal values and to show the long history of internal debate and division constituting non-Western discourses too often unproblematically assumed to be monolithic. Liu suggests that a novel mode of cross-cultural and cross-ideological argument emerges from this encounter: Rather than trying in vain to meet in a neutral battleground for a direct argumentative confrontation before a common audience, the two opposing parties in this paradigm would venture in the others' territory and seek to win the battle by provoking a civil war behind the opponents' line. In other words, the two contending sides would each try to justify its position in the other party's terms, and to turn the inter-communal issue that divides them into an

### AT Shively

intra-communal conflict between two factions of the opponent's side. The mutual infiltration, appropriation, and persuasion such a mode entails allow cross-cultural interlocutors to bypass the necessary lack of substantive common ground that would otherwise prevent them from engaging each other. They prevent them from bogging down in a deadlock over whose justificatory system to apply. They, moreover, guarantee that arguments framed in two radically different languages are not just intelligible, but meaningful and persuasive, to their respectively targeted audiences. 90 Cross-arguing, because it reveals the multivocal and contradictory nature of each party's traditions of political justification—and I am tempted to add each society's political conception of justice—and calls on each party to "intervene in the domestic affairs of the other," contributes to a process where the borders between self and other, internal and external, and us and them are increasingly blurred. Cross-arguing thus leads to "a reconfiguration of the internal forces and interests constitutive of the addressee's domestic cultural formation in response to, or in reaction against, the interests and desires that inform the addresser's arguments, causing the formation to become a little more other-oriented or a little less self-contained each time such a reconfiguration occurs." 91 In other words, cross-arguing makes it increasingly difficult to sustain an image of the other as the enemy; instead, we see the other as an adversary to be competed with, but not destroyed. 92 Further, this competitive desire will engender the need to understand what was once seen as alien and to reconstruct argumentation as a contest in which each side attempts to create an ever-wider frame of reference, a more inclusive conceptual scheme, so that they can be the ones to define the terms of the emergent context of mutual rights [End Page 255] and obligations. Yet because cross-arguing is a game without end every configuration or scheme will be sure to be contested and revised. I see in cross-arguing one way of reformulating public reason as an interactive and emergent ideal to be built by participants in deliberative forums. It has the unique advantage of not presupposing a counterfactual set of ethical dispositions that, as we have seen, may be used to turn political reasonableness into a method for silencing radical dissent. Nor does it trade the normative force of the ideal in for moral compromises, though it too is capable of engendering the invention of collaborative arrangements for addressing ongoing social problems. Cross-arguing, as a model of democratic disagreement, highlights the transformative potential of public debate and deliberation. It is precisely the transformative potential immanent in political controversy, the potential to make incommensurability the engine of innovation, and the potential for agonistic debate to transform self-interested participants into public-spirited actors that makes it so valuable for theories of deliberative democracy.

### 2AC Policy Good

#### That Mclean Card you gave me

#### We must over-determine ontology

William **Spanos**, Professor of English @ Binghamton University SUNY, **2008**,American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam, Pg.27-30

### 2ac Case

#### Flat ontology flattens impact calculus – don’t trust their evaluation of the good

Bryant Professor of Philosophy at Collin College 2011 Levi Democracy of Objects http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/9750134.0001.001/1:10/--democracy-of-objects?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

The foregoing chapters and sections lead to the conclusion that being is flat. The flatness of being is embodied in two fundamental claims. First, in light of our exploration of the interior of objects in chapter four, it becomes clear that ontologically the bland human-world gap or relationship possesses no metaphysical priority. As Harman puts it, “object-oriented philosophy holds that the relation of humans to pollen, oxygen, eagles, or windmills is no different in kind from the interaction of these objects with each other”.[290] Second, onticology and object-oriented philosophy establish what might be called a heteroverse or pluriverse, where entities at all levels of scale, whether natural or cultural, physical or artificial, material or semiotic are on equal ontological footing. As Ian Bogost puts it, “all beings equally exist, yet they do not exist equally”.[291] Onticology and object-oriented philosophy therefore democratizes being, asserting not one primary gap between subjects and objects, humans and world, mind and reality, but rather an infinity of gaps or vacuums between objects regardless of whether humans are involved. Likewise, onticology and object-oriented philosophy democratize being by defending a plurality of types of objects, ranging from the semiotic to the natural. Rather than treating one type of object such as quantum particles as the really real upon which all else is grounded and to which all else ultimately reduces, flat ontology advocates a pluralism of types of objects at all levels of scale that are irreducible to one another. In other words, objects of different types and at different levels of scale are what Aristotle referred to as genuine primary substances.